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Many people would agree with the view that uncertainty and  instability can be
serious obstacles to fixed investment decisions. Casual empiricism also suggests that most
fixed investments are more easily done than undone. Until recently, however, conventional
investment theory has paid little attention to these two facts and, more specifically, to the
links between them.
Those links are precisely the focus of a recent, but rapidly growing, investment
literature. This literature has shown that if investment is costly, or impossible, to reverse,
investors have an incentive to  postpone  commitment and wait for new information in
order  to  avoid  costly  mistakes.  Moreover,  this  'Value of  waiting" can  be  quite
considerable, especially in highly uncertain environments. As a consequence, uncertainty
can become a powerful investment deterrent -- a conclusion that seems to be supported by
mounting empirical evidence and has important policy implications.
This  paper  has two  objectives. First,  it  summarizes the  recent  analytical and
empirical literature on irreversible investment, focusing in particular on what the theory
implies -- and what it does not -- for the relationship between uncertainty and investment,
and drawing its consequences for macroeconomic policy.
The second objective of the paper is to gauge the relevance of the uncertainty-
investment link for Sub-Saharan Africa.  This seems an important task in the context of
the current policy discussion on the causes of Africa's dismal growth performance over
the last two  decades.'  The resumption of  sustained growth  in Africa will undoubtedly
require a substantial investment expansion -- that will have to  come primarily from the
private sector.2
Yet  the  recent  investment literature  suggests  that  the  economic and  political
instability suffered by many African countries can pose a formidable obstacle to the private
investment takeoff  To assess this question, the paper presents some preliminary empirical
evidence on the role of uncertainty and instability as investment deterrents, both in Africa
For recent analyses see Easterly and Levine (1996), Hadjirnichael  et.  al.  (1995) and World Bank
(1994).
2  See  Elbadawi  (1995)  for a discussion  of Africa's broad policy  priorities.2
and in other developing regions. In this regard, the paper complements and extends some
recent  empirical work  on  the determinants of private  investment in Africa. From  this
analysis, and drawing from the findings of the irreversibility literature, the paper derives
some policy lessons for reviving investment in Africa.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2  presents a  brief overview of the
theoretical literature  on investment irreversibility. Because the  analytics of irreversible
investment quickly become cumbersome, the discussion is organized around some simple
examples illustrating the main ideas. Next, section 3 summarizes a number of extensions
and  empirical applications  of  the  basic  analytical framework,  as  well as  the  related
empirical literature on uncertainty and investment. Section 4 focuses on the empirical links
between instability and private investment in Sub Saharan Africa, using a cross-regional
comparative perspective. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2.  Irreversible investment: an analytical overview
Over the last three  decades, conventional investment theory has  relied on two
essentially equivalent approaches. One is the cost-of-capital view of Jorgenson (1963),
according to which the firm's desired stock of capital is found by equating the marginal
product and the user cost. The other formulation, due to  Tobin (1969), focuses on the
capitalized value of the marginal unit of capital relative to  its replacement cost,  a ratio
known  as q.  In either  approach,  costs  of adjustment  -- typically  assumed  convex  -- need
to  be assumed to  transform an otherwise static problem to a dynamic setting involving
expectations about the future.
The empirical failure of these traditional views of investment 3,  and the lack  of
realism of some of their foundations -- notably the assumption of convex adjustment costs
--  have led to  the  emergence in the  last decade  of  a  new view  of  investment, that
emphasizes three  important features  of  most  investment decisions overlooked  by  the
conventional approach (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). First, most fixed capital investments are
partly or completely irreversible: the initial cost of investment is at least partially sunk -- it
See e.g. Abel and Blanchard  (1986).3
cannot be recovered  completely by selling the capital once it has  been put  in place 4.
Second, investment decisions have to  face uncertainty about their future rewards -- the
best investors can do is attach probabilities to the possible outcomes. Third, investors can
control the timing of investment, and postpone it in order  to acquire more information
about the future.
These three facts conform the so-called option approach that views an investment
opportunity as an option to  purchase an asset at different points in time. The optimal
investment policy balances the value of waiting for  new information with the  cost  of
postponing the investment in terms of forgone returns. When a firms makes an irreversible
investment expenditure, it kills its option to wait for new information that might affect the
desirability of the investment. To take account if this fact, the standard net-present-value
investment rule (invest when the anticipated return  on the additional capital equals its
purchase and installation cost) must be modified: the anticipated return must exceed the
purchase and installation cost by an amount equal to the value of keeping the option alive. 5
The recent literature has  shown that  the option value of waiting can be  considerable,
especially in a highly uncertain environment. As a consequence, uncertainty can become a
powerful deterrent even for risk-neutral investors.
While these ideas may seem intuitive, the analytics of irreversible investment are
far  from trivial. Thus, the  discussion in  this  section is  organized  around  two  simple
examples  introducing  the  basic  concepts.  The  interested  reader  is  referred  to  the
comprehensive discussion in Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
The single-project, two-period case
Consider a simple two-period example in which a risk-neutral firm has to  decide
whether to invest in an irreversible project whose purchase cost is PK  and whose future
4  Investment  irreversibility  was first studied  by Arrow (1968) in a deterministic context.  He showed
that  optimal irreversible investment is  characterized  by  alternating periods of positive gross
investment  and zero gross investment,  during the latter periods,  the shadow  value of capital is less
than its user cost.
The precise way in which the 'haive" net present value rule needs to be modified  is discussed  by
Abel  el. al. (1996).4
return is uncertain -- due perhaps to uncertainty about the price of the project's  output,
about market demand, or other similar causes. More specifically, assume that if investment
takes place now, the project will yield a known return RO at the end of this year, and then
an uncertain return R  in each succeeding year. With the information available today, the
expected value of the future return is Eo[R]. Hence the present value of the anticipated
stream of cash flows is
VO  -PK  R  L  1  (I  1  r)  E  [R]
=-PK  +  (1  +r) '[Ro + (1/r)E,  [R]]
where r  is the discount rate -- or the real rate of return on the altemative asset.  Naive
application of the net present value criterion would recommend undertaking the project if
Vo > 0, which can be conveniently  rewritten as: 6
rp)  + (Eo [RI - rpK  )  O
Note that, absent depreciation, rpK  is Jorgenson's  (1963) user cost of capital. If
investment were  fully reversible, then  the  future  would  not  matter,  and  the  optimal
decision would be to  invest now if and only if  Ro >  rpK  - i.e., if the current return
exceeds the user cost of capital -- because the decision can always be undone next period
should events tum out adverse.
However, even if (1) holds ex-ante, the firm may regret ex-post having undertaken
the project. This situation can arise if there is a chance that R < rpK, so that with some
probability the future return will fall short of the cost  of capital. In such case, the firm
would find itself committed to an unprofitable project. When such possibility exists, and
the firm can defer the investment to  leam more about the future return --  perhaps by
6  Observe  that equation (1) can also be viewed  as a version of the q approach: invest if the present
discounted  value  of the anticipated  returns exceeds  the purchase  cost of the project  -- i.e., if Tobin's
(I +r) [R 0 +  (I/ r)Eo [R]J
q is greater  than unity. In this context  Tobin's q is just  q  =  , where
PK
the numerator measures the present discounted  value of future profits from the project, and the
denominator  is its purchase  cost.5
observing the trajectory of output  prices or  demand determinants --,  the decision rule
given by (1) is incorrect. The reason is that it may pay to wait for more information before
making an irreversible commitment.
As  an  extreme example, assume that  uncertainty  will completely vanish  next
period, so that the future return will remain constant forever at whatever value is realized
next year. In such case, consider a strategy involving no action this year -- and therefore
no cash flows --  and undertaking the project  next year only if the return turns  out  to
exceed the user cost of capital, but not otherwise. The anticipated stream of cash flows
from this strategy is
V, =Pr[R >rpK  h(-PK  h)  + [  iE(l+r)  EoIR>rpR
Notice that the entire expression is multiplied by the probability that the project's  return
will tum out to exceed the user cost of capital, since only in that case will the investment
be made next year'. We can compare the two strategies by computing 8
JiV=(2[rR<P  EO[rPK  - RJR <  (&P1(2) VI  - VO  =  )  (1)Pr[R  < rPK  I  |P  }  p  (RO  ]  rPK)
It pays to invest immediately  if this expression is negative, which is equivalent to the
requirement
(Ro  -rpK)  >  Pr[R < rpK]  o[pK  -RR<rPK  (3)
r
This condition simply compares the cost of waiting -- the current period net return
(Ro  - rpK) forgone by not investing -- with the value of waiting, given by the irreversible
mistake that would be revealed tomorrow should future project returns fall short of the
user  cost  of  capital (i.e., R  <  rpK ).  The expected present  value  of  such  mistake is
measured by the right-hand side of (3): the mistake is made with probability Pr[R<rpK];  its
expected  per-period  size,  given  today's  information,  is Eo[rpK - RJR < rpK], and  since  it
Obviously,  it never pays  to wait  and then invest when  the return turns out to be below  rpK.
8  Recall that E, [R] _ Pr[R >  rpK  ]E 0[RJR  >  PK  I + Pr[R <  rpK  ]Eo[RJR  <  PK  I6
accrues every period into the indefinite future, it has to be multiplied by (1/r) to transform
it to  present value terms. It  pays to  invest immediately only if the  first-period return
exceeds the conventional user cost of capital by a margin large enough to compensate for
the possible irreversible mistake  -- i.e., if the  cost  of waiting outweighs the value of
waiting.
The remarkable feature of (3) is that  the 'good  news", represented  by a future
realization of R above rpK, is completely irrelevant for the investment threshold. This is
the bad news principle  first noted by Bernanke (1983):  only the expected severity of
future bad news matters for the decision whether to invest today; potential good  news
does not matter at all. The intuitive reason for this asymmetry is that the option to wait has
no value in states in which adopting the investment would have been the right decision -- it
is only valuable in those states in which early investment would have been regretted. This
option value of waiting equals the maximum  of V, - V0 and 0. If V,  < Vo  the option has no
value, and the optimal decision is to proceed immediately  with the investment.
Even with moderate amounts of uncertainty, however, the value of the option can
be quite substantial. This can be easily seen by computing the premium above the user cost
of capital that an irreversible project must offer for investors to give up their option to
wait. Consider a simple example of an irreversible project that with probability .10  will
'fail" -- in the sense of yielding an annual return 2 percentage points below the discount
rate r - and with probability .90 will '§ucceed" Letting PK=  I and r=.04, we can ask: what
immediate return RO  must the project  offer for a risk-neutral investor to  undertake it ?
Simple calculations using (3) above show that RO must be at least 9 percent -- i.e., five
percentage points above the cost of capital -- for a rational investor to adopt it.
The key implication of the bad news principle is that any spread of the distribution
of future returns, whether mean preserving or not, which increases downside uncertainty,
raises  the option value of  waiting and therefore  tends  to  depress  investment. 9 In  the
Some  exceptions  to this rule  should  be noted,  however.  If investment  is at least  partially  reversible,
and the  cost of investing tomorrow  is relatively  high (i.e., pK  is rising  over time),  the asymmetry
could be reversed  into a 'good  news"  principle,  whereby  only upside  uncertainty  would  matter, and
its effect would be to hasten investment (Abel et. al. 1996). Likewise, if the opportunity cost of
waiting  Ro is uncertain  rather than known -- as would  be the case for investment  projects  subject  to
completion  lags -- and the  firm  can abandon  the project  (at a cost)  in the future,  then  again  higher7
preceding example, assume that we reduce the project's  return in the adverse scenario by
1 percent, so that now it falls short of r by 3 percent. [We can also raise the returns in the
favorable scenario as  much as we  want,  but  these  are irrelevant.] With  all the  other
parameters unchanged, Ro now must be at least 11 percent! Two extra points of premium
are now required, because the irreversible rnistake has become larger.'0
Selection among multiple projects
So far we have assumed that only one investment project was available to the firm.
However, an important corollary of the bad news principle concerns the selection among
multiple irreversible investment projects: any events that threaten to alter the profitability
ranking of the different projects -- even if they increase the absolute returns to all projects
--  tend  to reduce  investment.
Another  example may serve to  illustrate this  point.  Consider  a  firm deciding
between two projects, both of which require an investment equal to  I ( = PK). The first
one uses labor, and therefore its future return depends on the evolution of the real wage.
Today the real wage equals wo; from next year on, it can rise to  a high level wH with
probability (I-p)  or fall to a low level w'  with probability  p.  The project's  annual return
equals I minus the real wage, so that the net present value of its cash flows is
Vo  (project 1) = -1+ (I + r)-  [(I - wo) + (I1/  r){fp(l  _ w L)  + (I  _ p)(l  _ w H)}]
and it is assumed that (I -wL)  > (1-wH)  > r, and (1-wo)  > r, so that the project is profitable
in either  scenario.  By contrast,  the second  project  uses  no labor and therefore  its return  is
independent of the real wage. Assume the annual return equals a. Then:
VO  (project  2) = -1 + (I +  r)-'[a  + (I / r)a] = -1 + (a / r)
uncertainty  could hasten investment,  by making extreme favorable  realizations  of Ro  more likely
(extreme  adverse  realizations  would also become  more likely,  but the firmn  could avoid their impact
by shutting  down the project)  and thus raising the cost of waiting along with the value of waiting
(see  Bar-Ilan  and Strange 1996).
°  However,  these large premia are consistent  with the high 'hurdle rates"  applied in practice  by firm
managers  when assessing  investment  projects.8
Assume that at first a  < (1-wf'). The second project is always less profitable than
the first one, and the optimal strategy is to  undertake project  1 immediately. Suppose,
however, that a technical improvement causes a to rise to  1-wI'  < a < 1- wL, so that with
high wages  project  2  becomes more  profitable than  project  1.  Intuitively, since the
profitability of at least one project has risen, investment should be encouraged. But this is
not the  case, because now it may be better  to  wait until next period, and then adopt
project I if wages turn out low and project 2 if they are high. This strategy would yield:
V  +  (-1)  1  I  p(l-wL)±(1-p)aj
It is easy to verify that waiting becomes the optimal strategy if
(l-w  -r)  (  p)(a -[-  wH)
r
p(i  - W L _  a)
(a-r)  <
If both inequalities hold, an increase in the profitability of project 2, without any decline in
the profitability of project 1, actually lowers investment, as the firm now prefers to  wait
until next period in order to avoid the irreversible mistake of having chosen what could
turn out  to  be the 'bad" project --  a problem that  previously could not  arise because
project I was superior in every possible scenario.
Incremental  investment
The discussion above focused on discrete investment decisions, i.e., the adoption
of  specific projects  of  given  size.  In  reality, however,  firms typically operate  many
projects, and their investment decisions can be better viewed as determining the path of
their total capital stock.
The optimal irreversible investment policy of a firm facing uncertainty was first
analyzed by Bertola  (1988) and  Pindyck (1988).  They considered the  case of  a  firm
possessing  a  decreasing-returns technology  and  facing  a  downward-sloping  demand
schedule. Under such assumptions, successive marginal increments to the capital stock can
be  regarded  as  distinct  'projects",  each  of  which  contributes  its  marginal product9
independently of the others. Hence, similarly  to the above discussion, it is possible to find
an  investment threshold for each project,  and then sum over  the  different projects to
obtain the firn's  desired capacity expansion. As before, the profitability threshold that
must  be  reached  for  investment to  take  place  exceeds  the  user  cost  of  capital  as
conventionally computed, and  rises with the degree of uncertainty faced by the firm.
The characterization of the investment threshold, and its relation with the existing
degree of uncertainty, have been recently re-examined in a more general setting by Abel
and Eberly (1994, 1995a). They present a framework in which downward adjustment of
the capital stock is possible, but more costly than upward adjustment, and allow also for
the existence of convex adjustment costs to investment similar to those  assumed by the
conventional investment literature."  Hence, the standard q investment model (see e.g.,
Hayashi 1982) can be viewed as a particular case of this general setting.
In this framework, the optimal investment strategy is a two-trigger policy that can
be expressed in terms of Tobin's marginal q --  defined as the addition to the value of the
firm resulting from an additional unit of capital. If q exceeds a certain upper threshold q+,
positive gross investment occurs. In turn, if q falls below a lower threshold q-, negative
gross investment takes place -- i.e., the firm sells part of its capital stock. Between q+ and
q, investment equals zero.
This optimal policy can be illustrated with the help of Figure 1, adapted from Dixit
and  Pindyck (1994),  which  shows the  marginal cost  of  investment as  a  function of
investment. In the absence of fixed costs, the total  cost  of investment (disinvestment)
equals the capital purchase (sale) cost (revenue) plus the standard convex adjustment cost.
In general, the slope of the latter may differ for positive and negative investment. In such
framework, the upper threshold q+ is equal to the purchase price of capital, denoted PK  ,
plus the marginal adjustment cost  to  positive investment evaluated at zero  investment,
denoted C'(O+).  Likewise, the lower threshold q' equals the sale price of capital pK,  plus
the marginal adjustment cost to disinvestment evaluated at zero, C'(O).
They also  allow  for 'fow" fixed  costs -- i.e.,  costs  whose magnitude  is independent  of the volume  of
investment  but dependent  on the length  of the penod over which investment  takes  place. This
contrasts with 'stock"  fixed costs, which are independent  of this latter factor as well. Stock fixed
costs lead to "lumpy"  investment,  as analyzed  by Caballero  and Leahy  (1996).10
If  q is above q+, investment is positive, and if q is below q', investment is negative.
Between q+ and q- there is a range of inaction. Such range exists as long as (i) PK  > Pi,
so that capital can be sold only at a loss; or (ii) marginal adjustment costs are steeper for
positive than for negative investment, i.e., C'(O+)  > C'(0); or (iii) there arefixed  costs to
investment (ignored in the figure). Moreover,  investment is  determined exclusively by
Tobin's (marginal) q, by pK  and pi,  and by the parameters characterizing the adjustment
cost function. 12
If convex adjustment costs are ruled out, investment occurs in episodic bursts. The
firm's optimal policy involves purchasing or selling capital to keep its marginal revenue
product between an upper and a lower bound, 7rK and aj  (Abel and Eberly, 199Sa). When
the  marginal revenue product  reaches  either  of  these  bounds,  a  burst  of  investment
(positive or negative) occurs to equalize the actual and optimal capital stocks. In turn, if
the marginal revenue product is between both bounds, no action is taken (see Figure 2).
These bounds can be interpreted as the correctly-measured user cost of capital relevant for
investment and disinvestment, respectively. Specifically, ATK'  (respectively, r-)  exceeds
(falls short of) the conventionally-defined  user cost of capital, that would equal (r+ )pK+
(or  (r+&K)pK  for  disinvestments). Most  importantly, higher uncertainty increases  the
wedge between the upper and lower bounds, and thus the range of inaction.
Uncertainty and investment
The models just described characterize the critical threshold that must be reached
by the marginal profitability of capital in order for investment to occur. They predict that if
volatility increases the investment threshold will also rise -- firms will be more reluctant to
invest to avoid getting caught vith too much capital, should the future turn out worse than
expected. By contrast, if the future turns out better than expected, the firm can just add
more capital as needed.
12  If C'(O)<O  and/or fixed  costs exist, it is possible  that q- < 0, in which case negative  investment  will
never be observed,  as implied  by the strict irreversibility  hypothesis.11
However, the models do not characterize the impact of volatility on investment.
Such impact depends in addition on the effects of volatility on the marginal profitability of
capital. For example, if the marginal revenue product of capital is a convex function of the
variable whose evolution is uncertain (e.g., the output price or the real wage), then higher
uncertainty raises expected profitability and,  ceteris paribus,  the  desired capital stock
(Hartman 1972, Abel 1983).  3 This effect goes in opposite direction to the threshold effect
above, and the net result is in general indeterminate. As  shown by  Caballero (1991),
decreasing returns to  scale and/or imperfect competition -- either  of which makes the
marginal revenue product of capital a decreasing function of the capital stock -- make it
more likely that the threshold effect will dominate, so that  higher uncertainty leads to
lower investment.  14
A  second  difficulty is  that,  even  if  the  threshold  effect  dominates  so  that
irreversibility and uncertainty reduce investment (or the desired capital stock) ex-ante in
the short run, little can be said on their long-run impact (Bertola and Caballero, 1994).
Higher degrees of irreversibility and/or uncertainty make it more likely that firms will ex-
post find themselves holding too much capital. This 'hangover effect" (Abel and Eberly,
1  995b)  tends  to  increase  the  long-run  capital  stock  (and  other  measures  like  the
investment/output ratio) above the level that would have prevailed with less irreversibility
or less uncertainty." 5
However, some inferences about the impact of uncertainty on investment can still
be drawn from  these models. In particular, temporary increases in  uncertainty should
13  A familiar scenario  has capital as the only fixed factor, while other productive  inputs (e.g., labor)
can be costlessly  adjusted  in the face of changing prices. Price shocks lead the firm to change the
optimal  capital/abor mix, thus causing  the marginal  revenue  product  of capital to rise more  (or fall
less) than output  prices -- i.e., the former  will be a convex  function  of the latter.
14  In the special  case  of constant  returns  to scale  and perfect  competition,  the opposite  result  obtains
(Caballero, 1991). The reason is that the marginal revenue  product  of capital (whether current or
future)  does  not depend  on the capital  stock,  and therefore  the firm  is no more  reluctant  to invest
under irreversibility  than it would  be with perfect  reversibility.  However,  the effect  of aggregate (as
opposed  to idiosyncratic)  uncertainty  on investment  of a competitive  industry can still  be negative
(Caballero  and  Pindyck,  1992).
5  The  lack  of  a more  robust  linkage  between  uncertainty  and investment  through  irreversibility  has led
some researchers  to look for alternative  rationalizations.  One example  is the disappointment
aversion"  analyzed  by  Aizenman  and  Marion  (1995).12
reduce investment, at least in the short run, because fewer projects will exceed the higher
investment threshold resulting from increased volatility.
Aggregation
All the above discussion has been concerned with the investment decision of a
single firm. From the macroeconomic point of view, however, the question of primary
interest is the impact of irreversibility and uncertainty on aggregate investment. Yet it is
obvious that one cannot just  translate mechanically the above microeconomic results to
aggregate investment. In reality, we never observe the spells of zero aggregate investment
that should arise if all firms in the economy faced the irreversibility constraint -- or were
all at once in the range of inaction identified in microeconomic models. Instead, aggregate
investment displays considerable smoothness and inertia. 
16
To assess the role of irreversibility in aggregate investment it is therefore essential
to  take  explicitly into  consideration the  heterogeneity  of  individual firms'  investment
decisions. Each  firm adjusts its capital stock when profitability exceeds a  firm-specific
threshold, reflecting managerial abilities, output market conditions, and other idiosyncratic
factors. At any given time, some firms may be close to their trigger points and others far
from them. Firms may be subject to both aggregate shocks, which tend to push all firms
above or below their investment trigger points, and specific shocks, which push different
firms in different directions. Thus the response of aggregate investment to  an aggregate
shock  may  display substantial  inertia,  as  different  microeconomic  units  reach  their
investment thresholds at different times -- even though each firm's policy may involve a
discrete investment burst once its idiosyncratic threshold has been reached.
However, aggregation of individual  firms' investment policies is not easy because,
as we saw above, under irreversibility such policies are nonlinear. Thus, the impact of a
given economy-wide shock on aggregate investment depends, for example, on how many
individual  firms are within their inaction ranges, how far they are from their trigger points,
and how important are idiosyncratic shocks relative to aggregate shocks.
16  Indeed, the original rationale  behind the standard convex adjustment-cost  approach to investment
was precisely  to replicate  these  two empirical  facts.13
Bertola  and  Caballero  (1994)  have  recently  explored  the  implications  of
irreversibility for aggregate investment in a model in which individual firms'  investment
proceeds in discontinuous bursts. Individual investments are not synchronized, and firms
are subject to  idiosyncratic uncertainty in addition to aggregate uncertainty. As a result,
aggregate investment shows smoothness. A favorable aggregate disturbance (e.g., a fall in
the price of capital goods) may have a very small effect on aggregate investment if many
firms are far below their threshold for positive investment, and may take a long time to
develop its full impact, which depends  on  initial conditions --  i.e., on  firms'  original
situation relative to their respective investment  thresholds.
3.  Extensions and empirical applications
The basic models of irreversible investment summarized in the previous section
focused on output  demand and/or prices as the basic sources of uncertainty. It should be
clear, however, that  uncertainty arising from other sources  can have exactly the same
effect on irreversible  investment decisions, as an expanding literature has underscored. For
example, Ingersoll and Ross (1992) examine the consequences of interest rate uncertainty
in a context in which future investment returns are known. They show that interest rate
uncertainty creates a value of waiting; moreover, a decline in interest rates accompanied
by an increase in their volatility can actually reduce investment (see also Tornell  1990).
Thus, to promote investment the stability of interest rates might be more important than
their level.
Likewise,  Dixit  (1989)  and  Baldwin  and  Krugman  (1989)  focused  on  real
exchange rate uncertainty. They showed that sunk costs of entry may discourage firms
from moving into export activities that would appear profitable in light of current real
exchange rate levels.
Uncertainty may  also  be  policy-induced. The  case of  uncertain tax  policy is
addressed by Hassett and Metcalf (1994). They show that an increase in the volatility of
taxes (specifically, an investment tax credit) has the usual effect of raising the hurdle rate
required by investors to undertake irreversible projects. However, they also conclude that14
the overall impact on investment generally depends on the  specific form taken  by tax
uncertainty (see Hubbard 1994 for further discussion).
From the policy viewpoint, an extremely important form of uncertainty faced by
investors  is  the  imperfect  credibility of  policy  reforms.  Investment-friendly reforms
typically raise expected returns, but may also increase uncertainty if investors believe that
the reform measures could be reversed. In such context, investors'  perceptions about the
probability of reversal become a key determinant of the investment response. The reason is
of course that the possibility of policy reversal creates  a value of waiting for investors
facing irreversible projects.  Thus, lack  of confidence can be  reflected  in  a weak  and
delayed investment response, as it may take time for investors to become convinced that
the reforms will be sustained. This pattern is in fact consistent with the 'investment pause"
often observed  in the  aftermath of  adjustment programs  in  developing countries (see
World Bank 1993).
These issues are explored by Rodrik (1991) using a model in which investment
involves sunk costs of entry and exit. He  shows that a reform favorable to  capital, but
regarded as less than fully credible, will fail to trigger off an investment response unless
the return on capital becomes high enough to  compensate investors for the losses they
would incur should the reversal take place. Following Rodrik, this can be illustrated with
the help of equation (3) above, modified to let Ro-I  the return that would prevail if the
reform were reversed (forever), where I can be interpreted as a tax on capital that would
be re-imposed following reversal (and thus can be viewed as the '§ize" of the reversal).
Assuming that the reversal happens with probability I-p, and taking also pK=  1, (3) can be
rearranged to yield:
(Ro - r)  >  (3')
1 +r
I -p
This expression characterizes the premium over the risk-free rate that  investors
have to  be offered in compensation for the possibility of policy reversal. As noted by
Rodrik, the premium can be quite substantial even when credibility is rather high (see also
Dombusch  1990). For example, if the real discount rate r equals 3 percent, a 15 percentprobability that reform will collapse would require the current return Ro to  exceed r by
over 80 percent  of the value of t --  even though the probability of reversal is only 15
percent ! Thus, if t is 5 percent, say, the return Ro will have to be at least 9 percent (i.e.,
three times the interest rate) for investors to be willing to undertake irreversible  projects.
Similar qualitative  conclusions are  reached  by  van  Wijnbergen  (1985),  who
considers the case of a trade reform suspected to be only temporary. He shows that the
result can be a decline in investment in both the traded and non-traded goods sectors, as
investors wait for additional information and thus avoid irreversible commitment to  any
particular industry --  a  conclusion that  can be  easily understood  recalling our  earlier
discussion of the selection among multiple irreversible projects.
Thus, the perception that reforms may be unsustainable can have a very adverse
impact on investment. However,  it is important to  recognize that  the sustainability of
reform is ultimately endogenous, and  depends  largely on the  response of  the  private
sector.  Lack  of  a  sufficient investment response  can  delay growth,  increase  social
hardship, and ultimately force the reversal of the reforms,  confirming investors'  initial
skepticism.
This endogeneity is formally investigated by Laban (1991) in a  model in which
investors can repatriate flight capital following a stabilization that lacks full credibility.
Investors face a choice between irreversible fixed investment and liquid assets, and the
latter have an  option value, due to  the lack  of  confidence in  the  permanence of the
stabilization. At the same time, however, the sustainability of the program depends on its
ability to generate sufficient fixed investment -- a mechanism ignored by the individual
investor. Laban shows that  in these circumstances the  outcome  of the  stabilization is
generally indeterminate, as investors'  expectations can become self-fulfilling: pessimism
leads to  insufficient fixed investment and thus to  collapse of the stabilization program,
while optimism leads to the opposite result. The underlying reason is that the combination
of investment irreversibility and strategic complementarity of investors'  decisions creates
an externality, that drives a wedge between the social and private returns to investment.16
Empirical studies
The  empirical literature  on  irreversible investment has  lagged  far  behind the
theoretical developments. The main  reason  is  of  course  the  analytical complexity of
irreversible investment models, which typically involve nonlinear investment rules whose
empirical estimation is computationally cumbersome. As  a result,  most of the  existing
empirical studies of the impact of irreversibility adopt a reduced-form approach.
There are some exceptions, however. At the microeconomic level, an important
recent study by Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995), using a large sample of U.S.
plant-level data,  uncovers  strong  evidence of  irreversibility. Using  a  simple structural
model of irreversible investment, the authors find that adjustment of the capital stock to its
optimal level is highly nonlinear, and typically much faster for upward than for downward
movements in the capital stock -- as should be the case if retiring capital is more costly
than acquiring it.
Leahy and Whited (1995) use the same type of data in a reduced-form empirical
approach.  They  note  that  in  most  models  of  irreversible investment  the  effect  of
uncertainty on investment  operates through Tobin's (marginal) q. If such models are an
accurate description of reality, uncertainty should have a negative impact on q but  no
independent impact on  investment, once q  has  been controlled for".  Their  empirical
results using U.S. data provide support for this view. Likewise, recent empirical work by
Nilsen  and  Schiantarelli (1996)  using  Norwegian  plant-level data  in  a  reduced-form
framework also uncovers evidence of irreversibility  and lumpiness in investment.
At the aggregate level, in turn, Bertola and Caballero (1994) have implemented
empirically a structural model that follows explicitly from the aggregation of individual
firms' irreversible investment rules. The resulting specification of aggregate investment is
able to  capture the  key features  of the U.S.  data.  Caballero (1993)  applies a  similar
approach to developing country data, with equally promising results. These two  studies
illustrate  the  asymmetric response  of  aggregate  investment to  positive  and  negative
7  Strictly speaking, this is true as long as investment  does not involve (stock) fixed costs. In the
opposite case, investment  is lumpy,  and bears no monotonic  relation to marginal q. See Caballero
and Leahy  (1996).17
shocks,  and  its  strong  dependence  on  initial conditions:  after  a  deep  recession,  for
example, many firms are likely to be well below their investment thresholds, and therefore
the  responsiveness of aggregate investment to  positive incentive changes can be  very
limited.
A different approach is followed by Pindyck and Solimano (1993) to test for the
effects of uncertainty on aggregate (and also sectoral) investment (see also Caballero and
Pindyck  1992). As noted  earlier, the long-run impact of uncertainty on  investment is
ambiguous on theoretical grounds, but  its  impact on the profitability threshold above
which firms will invest is unambiguous. Thus, a test of the importance of irreversibility can
be  performed  by  investigating  the  dependence  of  that  threshold  on  measures  of
uncertainty.  Using panel data  for  industrial and  developing countries,  such  empirical
exercise reveals a moderate impact of the variability of the marginal profitability of capital
on the investment threshold. Pindyck and Solimano also find that inflation appears to be a
major cause of volatility and  is strongly negatively related to  measures of investment
performance -- thus suggesting that control of inflation can have a big investment payoff
Recently, Levy Yeyati (1996) has proposed a reintepretation of this result in the context of
a structural model of irreversibility  that highlights the role of current inflation as predictor
of the  future price volatility faced by investors. He  offers some empirical evidence in
support of this view.
A recent empirical study by Ibarra (1995) is one of the few to focus on the effects
of credibility. He explores the case of the Mexican trade liberalization of the late  1980s,
which was accompanied by a substantial private investment slump. Drawing from cross-
country evidence, he estimates empirically  the path of the probability of reform reversal,
and  shows  that  it  can  contribute  to  explain a  substantial  portion  of  the  observed
investment slowdown.
These  findings are  closely related  to  those  reported  by  a  growing  empirical
literature that examines the contribution of simple measures of uncertainty or volatility to
explaining private  investment performance,  typically in  the  framework  of  otherwise
conventional empirical specifications. Along these lines, Serven and Solimano (1993b) find
a  significant negative impact of  inflation and  real  exchange  rate  volatility on  private18
investment using panel data  for developing countries. The  same result is obtained by
Cardoso (1993) and Larrain and Vergara (1993) on panel data for Latin American and
East Asian developing countries, respectively.
Hausmann and Gavin (1995) likewise report  a  negative association between an
index of macroeconomic volatility -- which combines real GDP and real exchange rate
volatility -- and the investment/GDP ratio, using a large sample of developing countries.
By contrast,  Bleaney (1996), using  1980s averages for  some 40  developing countries,
finds only weak evidence that standard measures of macro instability (average inflation,
the fiscal balance, the variability of the real exchange rate) affect aggregate investment,
instead, in his sample such instability measures seem to have a direct impact on growth --
which appears to suggest that they reflect on the quality of investment.
Similarly, Aizenman and  Marion  (1995) report  a  negative correlation between
indicators of economic instability (such as the volatility of the terms of trade, inflation and
the real exchange rate)  and private investment, using averaged data  on 47 developing
countries  for  the  period  1970-92.  They  further  show  that  these  volatility  measures
contribute significantly  to  explain the performance of private investment in a regression
framework.
Finally, recent work by Ghosal and Loungani (1  996) focuses on the impact of price
uncertainty on investment using panel data for US  manufacturing industries. For those
subsectors with a high degree of product market competition, they find a large negative
and significant  effect of price volatility on sectoral investment.
Political and social instability
The  above discussion has focused  on  the  investment impact of  uncertainty as
reflected  by  the  volatility  of  macroeconomic variables.  However,  there  is  a  parallel
empirical literature -- based almost invariably on reduced-form specifications --concemed
with the effects of political instability on investment.
Under this heading we can include a broad range of issues, from political instability
understood as rapid government tumover  -- which can lead to an unstable incentive and
policy framework, thus  raising the value of waiting and  discouraging investment -- to19
more extreme forms of social and political unrest that create a more fundamental kind of
uncertainty for investors by threatening their property rights. This applies in particular to
political events involving a redefinition of the basic 'Wules  of the game',  especially when
they raise the risk of expropriation (like in Egypt in the 1950s or Nicaragua in the 1980s).
From the investment viewpoint, the effective enforcement of property rights is at
least as important as their formal definition. For example, the lack of impartial mechanisms
to resolve contractual disputes makes the returns to investment more difficult to predict,
as the practical validity of contracts becomes uncertain. Recent work by Knack and Keefer
(1995)  using cross-country data  shows that  indicators of  property rights  enforcement
(such  as the  perceived risk of  expropriation and  the  repudiation of  contracts  by  the
goverrnment)  are strongly associated with private investment performance. Indeed, once
such factors  are taken  into  consideration, Knack  and  Keefer show  that  conventional
indicators of political instability and social unrest do not contribute significantly  to explain
the cross-country performance of private investment.
A  likely important  source  of  social  tension  and  political  conflict  is  income
inequality. A  recent  literature  has  investigated the  relationship between  measures of
income  distribution  and  private  investment  performance.  Using  data  for  industrial
countries,  Persson  and  Tabellini  (1992)  find  a  positive  and  marginally significant
correlation between equality in income distribution and investment/GDP ratios, although
they  do  not  identify the  particular  mechanism responsible for  this  association.  More
recently, Alesina and Perotti (1995) have revisited this issue. Using cross-country data,
they  find  that  income  inequality raises  political  instability, which  in  turn  hampers
investment. Once political instability is controlled for, inequality has no independent effect
on investment, which suggests that  inequality tends to  deter investment by threatening
property rights, in line with the other results summarized above.
Policy implications
The general message from this analytical and empirical literature is that, from the
viewpoint of  investment, the stability and  predictability of the  incentive framework --
relative prices, demand, interest rates, taxes -- may be much more important than the level20
of the incentives themselves. This view has important consequences for macroeconomic
policy-making in developing countries in general, and for the design of reform programs in
particular.
From  the  macroeconomic  viewpoint,  the  key  policy  implication  is  that  to
encourage  the  investment response to  incentive changes macroeconomic stability and
investor confidence in  the  sustainability of the  policy framework are  essential. Thus,
governments should correct  unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances --  such  as  high
inflation, large public deficits and exchange rate  overvaluation --  because they  are  a
primary  cause  of  macroeconomic  instability and  uncertainty  about  future  policies.
Institutional reforms ensuring policy predictability, effective property rights, and stability
of the basic 'tules of the game" can also contribute to facilitate significantly  the investment
response to incentive changes.
It is less clear, however, how to  address the externality that may arise from the
interaction  of  the  option  to  wait  and  imperfect credibility, which  could  hamper  the
response to an economic reform program and leave the economy stuck in a self-fulfilling
low investment equilibrium. The externality would seem to  demand some kind of policy
intervention -- e.g., investment tax incentives. But such a measure could easily backfire,
because  it  would  almost  certainly send  the  wrong  signal to  investors  --  that  fiscal
irresponsibility and  tax  uncertainty  continue  to  rule. Other  external interventions to
reassure investor confidence --  like the provision of  sufficient external finance, or the
resolution of a debt overhang --  are likely to be much more effective in this regard.
In concluding this section, two important qualifications should be made concerning
much of the empirical literature on the uncertainty-investment link --  specifically, those
studies that uncover a long-run negative association between both variables.  As argued
earlier, their relation to  irreversibility is not entirely clear, since no such long-run impact
follows from the theoretical literature. Their findings therefore suggest that other forces --
e.g., investor risk aversion in a context where the ability to diversify risks is limited -- may
be at work in the data.
Second,  many  of  these  reduced-form  empirical  results  are  based  on  sample
measures of variability -- typically, variances or standard deviations of  relevant variables -21
- which suffer from two  shortcomings. First, variability does not necessarily amount to
uncertainty, except when events are unpredictable; in theory, more accurate measures of
uncertainty would be provided by, e.g., the variances of the innovations to the variables of
interest.  Second, sample measures of volatility fail to  reflect uncertainty of the  'peso
problem" variety,  concerning  agents'  expectations  about  events not  observed  in  the
sample. Yet  this kind of uncertainty --  like, for  example, subjective anticipations of a
policy reversal --  can be  critical, as  illustrated by  the discussion of  credibility in  the
preceding section. In this regard, variables that measure to some degree the sustainability
of economic policies -- the parallel market premium, the fiscal deficit, the debt burden --
can also provide useful information about the uncertainty perceived by investors.
4.  Uncertainty and investment: some implications for Africa
Concern  with  Africa's  disappointing growth  performance  over  the  last  two
decades  has prompted renewed interest in  its causes  and possible remedies (see  e.g.,
World Bank 1994). With fixed investment regarded virtually unanimously as one of the
key ingredients for growth (see Levine and Renelt 1992 and Schmidt-Hebbel, Serven and
Solimano 1996), the evolution of investment in Sub-Saharan Africa obviously deserves
closer scrutiny.
Table 1 presents indicators of investment performance across developing regions
for the 1970s and 1980s, drawing from World Bank data for 86 developing countries, of
which 40 belong to Sub-Saharan Africa; both private investment and total investment  as
ratios to  real GDP are reported. "' As the table shows, Sub-Saharan Africa lags behind
other developing regions along both dimensions, with the only exception of South Asia,
that presents roughly similar indicators. Both  regions are very far from the investment
ratios of the successful East-Asian economies. This is particularly striking in the case of
private  investment, which in the  1980s amounted  in Africa to  less than half the  level
observed in East Asia.
18  Whenever  possible,  private  investment  data exclude  the investment  of public  enterprises,  drawing
from Jaspersen,  Aylward  and Sumlinski  (1995). However,  this information  is not available  for every
country  in the sample,  and therefore  some heterogeneity  in this dimension  is likely  to be present in
our  data.22
Table I suggests that private investment ratios changed little in Africa over  1970-
90. While this is true for decade averages, private investment did indeed display some
fluctuation during that period. As Figure 3 shows, private investment followed a rising
trend  relative to  GDP  until the  early  1980s, which  was  reversed  after  1982 (public
investment, not shown in the figure, displays a similar, if somewhat more marked, pattern).
The figure also shows that this cycle of boom-bust was qualitatively similar to -- although
quantitatively more modest than -- those witnessed in other developing regions'9 (e.g., the
Latin America and Other LDC regions in the graph).
Empirical evidence
Africa's weak private investment performance has been the focus of several recent
empirical  studies.  These  studies  highlight the  role  of  uncertainty  and  instability as
investment  deterrents,  after  controlling  for  various  other  investment  determinants.
Hadjimichael  and Ghura (1995) analyze empirically  the private investment performance of
32 African countries over the period  1986-1992, using a specification that includes the
variabilities of  inflation and  the  real  exchange  rate  as  measures  of  macroeconomic
uncertainty, and  an index of  political and  civil liberties as proxy for  the definition of
property  rights.  Their  estimation results  show that  either  measure of  macroeconomic
uncertainty has a strong adverse impact on investment, while the political variable has a
positive but insignificant  effect. 20
These results are in agreement with those reported by Ghura and Grennes (1993)
in their study of macroeconomic performance in 33 Sub-Saharan African countries during
1972-1987. They find that real exchange rate volatility (measured by the coefficient of
variation) has a strong adverse impact on the (total) investment/GDP ratio. In tum, the
black market premium, which is taken in the study as a  measure of real exchange rate
misalignment, also has a significant  negative effect on investment.
9  This boom-bust  investment cycle in developing  countries is analyzed in  Serven and Solimano
(1993a).
20  See also Hadjimichael  el. al., 1995.23
Another  recent study by Kumar and Mlambo (1995) provides a  comprehensive
empirical investigation of  the  determinants of  private  investment in  40  Sub-Saharan
African  countries  over  1970-1993.  The  paper's  encompassing  framework  includes
variables measuring macroeconomic instability --  proxied by the inflation rate  and the
variability of the fiscal deficit and the terms of trade -- as well as measures of restrictions
on political and civil liberties, which the authors view as proxies for political instability.
Their results indicate a consistently strong and negative impact of inflation, while the other
two proxies for macroeconomic instability also carry the expected negative sign but only
become statistically significant after  1980. In turn, the two political indicators have also
the expected negative signs, although on the whole the measure of civil liberties appears to
exert a stronger impact on investment than the measure of political rights.
Since these  studies explore at  length the empirical link between  instability and
investment in Africa, a comparative perspective could provide a useful complement to
their analyses. With this objective (and subject to the caveats expressed earlier about the
use of  sample measures of uncertainty), Table 2  presents some  regional indicators of
economic instability:  inflation, the black market premium, and the variabilities  of these two
variables plus those of the real exchange rate and the terms of trade.2'
It  is important to  clarify how these variabilities are measured. In the case of the
terms of trade and the real exchange rate, for each country and year we  calculate the
coefficient of variation of the relevant variable over a three-year horizon (i.e., the current
plus the previous two years). For inflation and the black market premium, we follow the
same  procedure  but  compute  the  standard  deviation  rather  than  the  coefficient  of
variation. 22 This provides a time series for each country (notice we  lose the first two
annual observations); we then compute country averages for the subperiods presented in
Table 2.
21  To limit the impact of outliers, we transformed  both inflation and the black market premium to
x/(1+x),  where  x is the variable  as originally  measured.
22  The coefficient  of variation  is not appropriate  for inflation  and the black market  premium  because  at
very low inflation  (or very  low premium)  the coefficient  of variation would  become  extremely  large.
In turn, for the terms of trade and the real exchange  rate we did compute  also standard deviations,
which led to regional  rankings  similar  to those in Table  2.24
The most striking fact in Table 2 is perhaps the clearly superior performance of
East  Asia  and,  to  some  extent,  also  South  Asia,  along  all  dimensions of  econormic
instability, not only in the policy-related ones (inflation, black market premium and real
exchange rate) but even in the more "chance-related" terms of trade.
Concerning Africa, the table also reveals a number of interesting facts. First, in
terms of both average inflation and inflation volatility, Sub-Saharan Africa is above other
LDC  regions -- with the obvious  exception  of Latin America  -- and, in particular,  far from
the low levels of East Asia, especially in the 1980s. Second, black market premia are high
in Africa,  but  -- at  least  over  the  time  period  considered  here  -- not  as high  as in other
developing regions, excluding of course East Asia. Third, variability of the parallel market
premium is relatively moderate in Sub-Saharan Africa, once account is taken of a  few
outlying observations (notably Ghana in the 1  980s). Fourth, Africa is at or near the top in
terms of  real exchange rate  and terms-of-trade variability -- with  the latter fact likely
reflecting the poorly diversified structure of Africa's foreign trade.
To  complement these indicators of macroeconomic instability, Table 3 presents
eleven  measures of  socio-political instability and  institutional quality.  The first  seven
variables in the table  (assassinations, coups,  constitutional changes, government crises,
riots, revolutions and cabinet changes) measure different forms of civil unrest and political
instability, and are commonly used in the political economy literature23. The eighth is a
dummy variable that for  each country takes  the value of one in those  years when the
country in question is involved in a war (civil or international). The ninth is an index of
restrictions on civil liberties, taken from Barro and Lee (1994), and used in the investment
study by Kumar and Mlambo (1995). The tenth variable is the ethnic division indicator
examined by Easterly and Levine (1996) in their comparative analysis of growth in Africa;
it can be viewed as an indicator of underlying social tensions. Finally, the last variable is an
indicator of property rights, taken from Knack and Keefer (1995);24  unlike with all the
23  The primary source  is Banks (1994).25
other variables, in this case a higher value represents a  better  score.  All the variables
shown in the table are available annually, with the exception of the last two.  Since the
information is in all cases qualitative, outlying observations are less of a concern than in
the  case  of  the  economic instability indicators  above,  and  thus  to  keep  the  table
manageable only the regional means are presented.
According to  the figures in Table 3, Sub-Saharan Africa presents a mixed report
card. Relative to other regions, she scores relatively well in some civil unrest indicators
(assassinations, government crises and riots),  badly in others  (coups and constitutional
changes) and places at the middle in the rest. This mixed outcome, however, might reflect
in  part  weaknesses of  these  civil unrest  measures, which  are  largely compiled from
international press reports whose coverage may not be balanced across world regions.
Turning to the remaining  variables in the table, Africa has the worst score in terms
the civil liberties indicator, and the second-worst in terms of ethnic division. Finally, the
property rights and frequency of war indicators rank Africa at the middle.
What  does  all this  imply from  the  point  of  view  of  private  investment ?  A
preliminary assessment can be given by examining  the correlations of these indicators with
investment ratios. This is done in Table 4 for the economic instability variables, and in
Tables 5 and 6 for the political and  institutional variables; in addition, the tables also
present the cross-correlations between the different indicators.
To assess the possible impact of outliers, Table 4 presents both simple correlations
(top half of the table) and Spearman rank correlations (bottom half); the latter are robust
to extreme observations. The results in the table confirm the strong negative association
between private investment and economic instability reported by the empirical literature:
all the correlations with investment are negative and significant at the I percent level, with
the  only  exception  of  the  rank  correlation  with  inflation, which  is  not  significant.
Moreover, the different indicators do not appear strongly correlated with each other, with
24  It  represents  a combined assessment  of three factors affecting the definition of property rights:
govermment  repudiation  of contracts,  expropriation  risk, and the rule of law. A higher value means
more  certainty  about  property  rights.26
the main exceptions of inflation and its variability, and the parallel market premium and its
variability.
Table 5 presents analogous information for the political and institutional variables
on which annual information is available. 25 The most striking result is the strong negative
correlation of investment with the measure of restrictions on civil liberties, which is large
and  extremely  significant. The  war  dummy likewise  displays  a  significant negative
association with the private investment ratio. Regarding the civil unrest variables, two of
them  (revolutions and  cabinet changes) consistently  show  a  negative  and  significant
correlation with investment, and the remaining five appear uncorrelated with the private
investment ratio.
Finally, Table 6 presents similar information for the two socio-political indicators
lacking annual information. Their cross-sectional correlations with private investment have
the expected signs -- deeper ethnic division and weaker property rights are associated with
lower investment -- but on the whole their precision is not high (they are significant at the
10 percent level only), likely reflecting the much smaller sample size.
On the whole,  the  above results do  bring  out  a  negative association between
private investment performance and measures of economic and  political instability and
institutional weakness. However, these are just bivariate correlations, and one may wonder
to what extent economic and political instability continues to be negatively associated with
private  investment  once  other  standard  investment  determinants  are  taken  into
consideration.
While a thorough empirical assessment of the determinants of private investment
across the world is well beyond the scope of this paper, Table 7 presents some preliminary
estimation  results  using  conventional  reduced-form  investment  equations  to  which
measures  of  instability have  been  added  as  regressors.  The  basic  specification  is
comparable to those considered in the recent empirical studies of investment in Africa just
mentioned, but the panel data sample used here covers other developing regions as well.
25  Notice that there is a potential sample selection  problem here. At times of acute political conflict
(e.g., wars), information  on investment  and other economic  variables may be unavailable.  If, as
seems plausible,  investment  is lower in those situations,  its negative association  with measures of
political  conflict  will be understated  by the available  data.27
Data  limitations  are  substantial  and  deserve  explicit  consideration.  First,  the
availability of  data  on  the various  regressors differs across  countries and  years,  and
therefore the panel data set is unbalanced. Second, the samples for which all regressors are
available are substantially smaller than those used in the bivariate correlations above. This
is especially problematic regarding interest rate data, which were unavailable for a large
number of countries; thus, we present regression results both with and without interest
rates. Table 7 reports GLS random effects estimates; while fixed effect specifications were
also estimated, Hausman tests  (shown at the bottom of the table)  could not  reject the
validity of the asymptotically-efficient  GLS estimates.
In addition to the institutional and instability  indicators, the empirical specifications
include  several  standard  regressors:  real  per-capita  GDP,  real  GDP  growth,  public
investment, real domestic credit growth (alternatively, the real ex-post interest rate), the
terms of trade, the fiscal surplus, and the external debt/GDP ratio. This set of regressors is
similar to those encountered in the cross-country investment studies mentioned earlier.
The first two columns of Table 7 exclude interest rates.  The estimation results
show  that  among conventional investment determinants, real per-capita  GDP and  the
public investment ratio have a positive and significant impact on private investment. The
latter result  agrees with the findings of Hadjimichael and Ghura  1995 and Kumar and
Mlambo 1995, and suggests complementarity between private and public projects in the
sample. Somewhat surprisingly, the terms of trade has a negative and highly significant
impact on private investment -- a result also found by Kumar and Mlambo (1995) which
suggests that trade windfalls  lead to consumption, not investment, booms, and/or favor the
expansion of labor-intensive, rather than capital-intensive, economic activities.
The estimation results show no appreciable effect of domestic credit growth on
investment.  In  turn,  the  fiscal  surplus  has  a  strongly  favorable  impact  on  private
investment, in accordance with previous studies, while exactly the reverse is true for the
external debt/GDP ratio; both parameters are highly significant. By contrast, the inflation
rate and the black market premium have no significant  effect.
The next four regressors are the economic instability measures examined above --
the variabilities of the terms of trade,  inflation, the black market premium and the real28
exchange rate. In column 1, the first two are found to have a significant adverse impact on
private investment.
The final set of regressors in Table 7 are the political/institutional indicators on
which information is  available annually. In  column 1, which  excludes the  civil unrest
variables, both the war dummy and the indicator of restrictions on civil liberties have a
significantly  negative impact on investment.
Column 2 adds the seven indicators of civil unrest to  the empirical specification.
This results in the loss of some 50 observations for which such indicators are unavailable.
Only the variable measuring cabinet changes turns out significant (at the 10 percent level);
it carries a negative sign, as expected. In turn, the estimates and standard errors of the
remaining parameters show little change, with the exceptions of the black market premium
and the war dummy -- whose coefficients become substantially larger (in absolute value)
and more significant.
Columns 3 and 4 replace the domestic credit variable with the real ex-post interest
rate. Unfortunately, this causes the loss of nearly 50 percent of the sample observations,
which in turn leads to a general loss of precision.  In column 3, which excludes the civil
unrest indicators, the real interest rate itself carries a significant negative coefficient, as
should be expected. Public investment and the black market premium become insignificant
and, among the econonic  instability indicators, only the terms of trade retains significance
in the reduced sample. The estimated coefficient on the civil liberties indicator is similar to
that in columns I and 2, but ;t is now insignificant. By contrast, the war dummy remains
strongly significant.
Finally, column 4  adds  again the civil unrest  variables, leading to  the loss  of
another  40  observations  (and  a  further  loss  of  precision). None  of  the  civil unrest
indicators is statistically significant, and in addition the  real interest rate  and the fiscal
surplus  become  insignificant. The  black  market  premium,  however,  now  carries  a
significantly (at the  10 percent  level) negative coefficient. Among the other  instability
indicators, the  terms  of  trade  variability and  the  war  dummy retain  their  significant
negative association with private investment.29
The above results are admittedly very preliminary and, due to their reduced-form
framework,  cannot  be  strictly  viewed  as  identifying causation  (rather  than  simple
association)  between  variables.  Nevertheless,  the  estimates  do  indicate  that  fiscal
imbalances, high external debt, inflation variability, black market premia and terms of trade
volatility are significantly associated with  a  worsened private  investment performance,
after controlling for standard investment determinants. Likewise, the regressions show a
strong negative association between extreme sociopolitical conflict in the form of war and
private investment. Finally, at least in the larger sample considered above, the results also
provide evidence that government instability (as measured by the frequency of cabinet
changes) and tighter restrictions on civil liberties are significantly associated with lower
private investment ratios. 26 Thus, on the whole the multivariate regression results appear
consistent with the bivariate correlations examined earlier.
To  conclude this  section, what  are  the  policy implications for  Africa of  the
empirical evidence reviewed here ?  In  a  medium-term perspective, the resumption  of
growth will undoubtedly require an increase in investment ratios, which will have to come
primarily from the private sector. But in spite of the modest achievements of the reform
programs  initiated in the  late  1980s, macroeconomic instability --  high  fiscal deficits,
inflation, real exchange rate overvaluation -- remains a concern in many African countries
(World Bank,  1994). Both  the analytical discussion in the  previous  sections and  the
empirical evidence above suggest that the region has much to gain in terms of investment
from further progress in the reduction of macroeconomic imbalances and macroeconomic
volatility. Establishing a sustainable fiscal position, consistent with low and predictable
inflation,  emerges  as  a  major  priority.  In  addition,  at  a  more  fundamental  level,
institutional reforms protecting property rights and fostering social consensus may be a
promising avenue.
In other areas the implications are less clear-cut. What can be  done about the
volatility of the terms of trade, which is higher in Africa than in  other regions ?  The
26  It is debatable,  however,  whether the civil liberties indicator is capturing underlying  sociopolitical
tensions (as assumed  by Kumar  and Mlambo, 1995)  or rather the quality  of the overall  institutional
framework.30
obvious answer is of course to  achieve a more diversified export base, but this cannot be
done overnight. And what about the external debt burden ? The regressions suggest that it
may pose a significant obstacle for investment resumption in a number of countries -- not
only because of the drain on investible resources that debt service implies, but possibly
also due to the adverse effect that the perceived debt overhang may have on the credibility
of the reform efforts. The implication is that Africa may need a substantial reduction in her
debt burden to  set investment and growth in motion. Indeed, the international community
has started moving in this direction.
5. Concluding remarks
This paper has reviewed a recent investment literature that highlights the  option
value of  waiting. When there  is  uncertainty and  investment projects  are  irreversible,
waiting for more information has a value because it can help avoid costly mistakes, should
the projects be revealed as unprofitable due to  adverse events. The literature shows that
the value of waiting can be  extremely high even with  moderate uncertainty. Thus, the
latter becomes a powerful investment deterrent even under strict risk-neutrality. The key
implication is that, to encourage investment, the stability and predictability of the incentive
framework  -- relative prices, demand, interest rates, taxes -- may be much more important
than the level of the incentives themselves. To put it differently, huge incentives may be
necessary for  investors  to  give  up  their  option  to  wait  and  commit themselves  to
irreversible investment in an uncertain environment.
The central implication for macroeconomic policy is that, to encourage investment
and facilitate its response to incentive changes, governments should attach top priority to
correction of unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances --  such as  high inflation, large
public  deficits  and  exchange  rate  overvaluation  --  which  are  a  primary  cause  of
macroeconomic instability and uncertainty about future policies. Institutional reforms to
reduce social tensions and ensure the enforcement of property rights can also go a long
way to facilitate the response of investment to incentive changes.
The paper has also examined the practical relevance of the uncertainty-investment
link for developing countries in general and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular. Using a31
cross-country  perspective, the  comparative  evidence reveals that  Sub-Saharan  Africa
stands out for the volatility of her terms of trade and real exchange rates, and for her poor
indicators in terms  of property  rights  and  civil liberties. Based  on  a  large  sample of
developing country data, the paper has shown that these and other indicators of instability
and institutional quality are negatively  related to private investment. The implication  is that
Sub-Saharan Africa may have much to  gain from progress in  reducing economic and
political instability  and improving her institutions.
In concluding, while the irreversibility approach brings out  a number of relevant
policy implications, it is important to be aware also of its limitations. Three of them are
worth  mentioning here. First, on theoretical  grounds irreversibility cannot  explain the
negative long-term  association between instability (whether economic or political) and
investment performance found by a number of empirical studies. While such relation might
arise under particular conditions, it is by no means a general consequence of investment
irreversibility, and likely reflects the simultaneous action of other factors, such as investor
risk aversion and limited access to risk diversification.
Second, from an analytical perspective, irreversible investment is only one of the
factors that can render investment decisions insensitive to  changes in incentives. Other
reasons, such as liquidity constraints (Hubbard 1994) or fixed costs (Caballero and Leahy
1996) can likewise create a 'tange of inaction"  for investment, in which firms fail to tune
their investment decisions to changing profitability conditions.
Third, and most important, the irreversibility approach only describes investors'
decisions about when (or whether) to  adopt profitable investment projects (or exercise
their investment 'bptions').  At least equally important from the policy viewpoint is the
question  of  how  these  profitable  investment opportunities  arise  in  the  first  place.
Specifically, in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, what are the key policies that would
help generate  valuable  investment options  ?  The  right  answer  surely  varies  across
countries, but investment in human capital, adequate infrastructure provision and effective
institutions fostering property rights and social consensus would undoubtedly be at the top
of the priority list.32
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Table 1
Investment / GDP ratios in developing regions
(percent at constant prices)
1970-79  1980-90  1970-90
1. Private  investment
Sub-Saharan  Africa  8.19  8.27  8.66
Latin America  14.64  12.05  13.22
South  Asia  7.14  10.01  8.29
East Asia  17.16  17.42  17.28
Other  LDCs  9.64  11.43  11.07
2. Total investment
Sub-Saharan  Africa  17.45  17.72  17.45
Latin America  24.07  19.03  21.12
South  Asia  13.21  17.61  17.39
East Asia  25.45  29.42  27.35
Other LDCs  23.49  24.85  23.18
Notes:  the figures  correspond  to the regional  median of individual  country  averages  over  the respective  periods.
The country  groups  are defined  as follows:
1. Sub-Saharan Africa (40 countries):
Angola,  Benin,  Burundi,  Cameroon,  Cape  Verde,  Central  Africa  Republic,  Chad, Congo,  Cote  d'lvore, Djibouti,
Equatorial  Guinea,  Ethiopia,  Gabon,  Gambia,  Ghana,  Guniea-Bissau,  Guinea,  Kenya,  Lesotho,  Liberia,
Madagascar,  Malawi,  Mali,  Mauritania,  Mauritius,  Namnibia,  Rwanda,  Sao  Tome  and Principe, Senegal,
Sierra Leone,  Somalia,  South  Africa,  Sudan, Swaziland,  Tanzania, Togo,  Uganda,  Zaire,  Zambia  and Zimbabwe.
2. Latin America  (19  countries):
Argentina,  Bolivia,  Chile, Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Dominican  Republic,  Ecuador,  El Salvador,  Guatemala,
Guyana,  Haiti,  Honduras,  Jamaica,  Mexico,  Panama,  Paraguay,  Peru, Uruguay,  Venezuela.
3. South  Asia (5 countries):
Bangladesh,  India, Nepal, Pakistan,  Sri Lanka.
4. East Asia (7 countries):
Indonesia,  Korea,  Malaysia,  Papua  New  Guinea,  Philippines,  Singapore,  Thailand.
5. Other LDCs  (13 countries):
Algeria,  Bahrain,  Egypt,  Iran, Iraq, Jordan,  Kuwait,  Morocco,  Oman, Syrian  Arab  Rep., Tunisia,  Turkey,
United  Arab Emirates.
Source: World Bank data.Table 2
Regional Indicators of Economic  Instabit
Inflation  Inflation VariabilityA!  Black Market  Black Market Premiu  Real Exchange Rate  Terms of Trade
a/  bi  bi
Premium  Variabilitr  Variability  Variability
Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median
1.1970-79
Sub-Saharan Africa  10.44  9.20  5.98  5.46  15.70  5.22  19.81  7.96  7.78  6.65  13.47  10.25
Latin America  15.37  9.46  16.04  5.74  11.88  12.26  17.30  4.76  7.01  4.29  12.71  9.79
South Asia  7.42  6.63  6.39  6.43  28.88  27.31  25.20  22.45  11.13  5.90  10.15  8.22
East Asia  9.19  8.01  6.42  6.35  5.05  1.79  4.95  1.88  6.85  4.90  9.92  8.80
Other LDCs  9.19  8.08  3.67  3.64  14.27  11.52  8.56  9.33  5.72  5.05  14.28  9.30
2. 1980-90
Sub-Saharan Africa  13.25  10.09  9.55  5.38  20.30  10.67  53.80  9.89  12.14  9.15  9.05  6.78
Latin America  24.16  17.88  153.96  9.09  25.18  26.08  40.72  25.10  10.53  7.40  8.01  5.96
SouthAsia  8.63  8.31  3.05  2.38  21.60  14.21  16.11  13.54  4.53  3.35  5.76  4.46
East Asia  6.47  5.97  3.49  2.59  2.44  2.13  4.46  3.56  5.75  5.08  5.99  5.14
Other LDCs  11 55  7.84  5.39  3.52  31.39  7.52  63.35  15.99  10.75  8.33  11.29  7.23
3. 1970-90
Sub-SaharanAfrica  11.99  9.32  8.58  5,56  18.11  11.32  38.52  9.11  10.30  7.77  10.91  8.21
Latin America  19.97  13.84  95.89  7.60  18.85  18.44  30.86  25.46  9.05  5.39  9.99  7.42
South Asia  8.00  8.24  4.03  4.93  25.07  19.37  19.94  18.27  7.31  3.82  7.61  5.13
East Asia  7.75  6.83  4.69  4.09  3.69  2.19  4.66  2.79  6.21  5.01  7.64  6.29
Other LDCs  10.05  8.15  4.37  2.99  23.24  11.89  40.28  13.71  8.63  5.88  12.54  8.55
Notes:  - For each region and period the figures reflect the mean (or median) of the respective  countries' time-varying standard deviation, computed
in each year using the current and the two  lagged observations  of the variable in question.
bh  For each region and period the figures reflect the mean (or median) of the respective countries' time-varying coefficient  of variation,
computed in each year using the current and the too lagged observations  of the variable in question.Table 3
Rezional Indicators  of Socio-Political  Instability  and Institutional  Oualitv
(1970-90  Averages)
Constitutional  Government  Cabinet  Restrictions  on  Ethnic  Property
Assasinations  Coups  d'etat  Changes  Crises  Riots  Revolutions  Changes  War  Civil Liberties  Division  Rights
Region  w
Sub-SaharanAfrica  6.77  4.45  13.10  7.00  27.91  22.09  41.24  14.88  5.47  65.46  3.47
Latin America  75.44  5.54  8.03  25.81  43.61  21.80  44.87  13.68  3.60  26.63  3.32
South Asia  35.92  5.32  15.96  23.30  307.78  20.39  59.57  21.00  4.01  67.50  4.18
EastAsia  25.00  3.12  10.94  17.14  82.14  31.43  42.97  19.28  4.23  53.14  4.60
OtherLDCs  26.14  1.22  6.94  17.42  38.26  15.91  38.77  8.57  5.46  24.00  3.31
Note: For variable definitions, see text.Table 4
Correlation Between Private Investment and Economic Instability  Indicatorsa/
1. Simple correlation
Private Investment]  Inflation  Inflation  Black Market  Black Market Premium  Real Exchange  Terms of Trade
GDP Ratio  Variabilitv  Premium  Variability  Rate Variability  Variability
Private lnvestmcnt!  I  -0.055  -0.0558  -0.1185  -0.1086  -0.0708  -0.1409
GDP  Ratio  (0.0261)  (0.0276)  (0.0263)  (0.0276)  (0.0279)  (0.0249)
Inflation  1  0.3002  0.2712  0.2642  0.32  0.0516
(00276)  (0.0276)  (0.0289)  (0.0291)  (0.0273)
Inflation Variability  1  0.0381  0.0674  0.0771  0.0254
(0.0291)  (0.0291)  (0.0293)  (0.0276)
Black Market Premium  1  0.4177  0.1868  0.1542
(0.0276)  (0.029)  (0.0276)
Black Market Premium Variabilitv  1  0.1899  0.0663
(0.029)  (0.0276)
Real Exchange Rate Variability  1  0.0277
(0.0279)




Private Investment]  Iniflation  Inflation  Black Market  Black Market Premium  Real Exchange  Terms of Trade
GDP Ratio  Variability  Premium  Variability  Rate Variability  Variability
Private InvestmentV  I  -0.0162  -0.1305  -0.1020  -0.1680  -0.1490  -0.1171
GDP Ratio  (0.0261)  (0.0276)  (0.0263)  (0.0276)  (0.0279)  (0.0249)
Inflation  1  0.5483  0.2718  0.3346  0.2927  0.1041
(00276)  (0.0276)  (0.0289)  (0.0291)  (0.0273)
Inflation Variability  1  0.2215  0.2753  0.3345  0.1197
(0.0292)  (0.0291)  (0.0293)  (0.0276)
Black Market Premium  1  0.7516  0.0841  0.0830
(0.0276)  (0.0290)  (0.0276)
Black Market Premium Variability  1  0.1703  0.0906
(0.0290)  (0.0276)
Real Exchange Rate Variability  1  0.0113
(0.0279)
Terms of Trade Variability
Civil Liberties
Note: 'a  The correlations are computed using both the time-series and cross-countiv variation of each variable. Standard errors in parentheses.Table 5
Correlation Between Private  Investment and Socio-Political Indicators'
Private Investment/  Assasinations  Coups  d'etat  Constitutional  Government  Riots  Revolutions  Cabinet  Restrictions  on
GDP  Ratio  Change  Crises  Changes  War  Civil  Liberties
Private Investment/  1  0.0073  4-0388  -0.052  -0.001  0.0245  -0.0916  -0.0797  -0.0503  -0.2029
GDP Ratio  (0.0239)  (0.0251)  (0.0251)  (0.0239)  (0.0239)  (0.0239)  (0.0251)  (0.0250)  (0.0265)
Assasinations  1  0.576  0.0299  0.1877  0.1574  0.2082  0.0905  0.2830  -0.0599
(0.0252)  (0.0252)  (0.0239)  (0.0239)  (0.0239)  (0.0252)  (0.0254)  (0.0266)
Coups  d'etat  1  0.3844  0.2264  0.0234  0.3761  0.2792  0.0751  0.0036
(0.0251)  (0.0252)  (0.0252)  (0.0252)  (0.0251)  (0.0260)  (0.0281)
Constitutional  Change  1  0.1224  0.0309  0.1908  0.2369  0.0885  0.0216
(0.0252)  (0.0252)  (0.0252)  (0.0251)  (0.0260)  (0.0281)
Government Crises  1  0.  1777  0.2764  0.2430  0.0630  -0.0959
(0.0239)  (0.0239)  (0.0252)  (0.0254)  (0.0266)
Riots  1  0.0558  0.1307  0.1615  -0.1538
(0.0239)  (0.0252)  (0.0254)  (0.0266)  O
Revolutions  1  0.2561  0.3704  0.0665
(0.0252)  (0.0254)  (00266)
Cabinet Changes  1  -0.0036  -0.0442
(0.0260)  (0.0281)
War  1  0.0217
(0.0281)
Restrictions  on Civil Liberties  1
Note: i  The  correlations  are computed  using both  the time-series  and cross-country  variation  of each variable. Standard  errors in parentheses.41
Table 6
Cross-Country Correlation Between Private Investment and
Institutional/Political Indicators§1
Private Investment/  Ethnic Division  Property  Rights
GDP  Ratio
Private  Investment/GDP  Ratio  1  -0.1623  0.2261
(0.1179)  (0.1231)
Ethnic Division  1  00193
(0.125)
Property  Rights  I
- Correlations  between  the 1970-90  country  averages  of the corresponding  variables.
Standard  errors in parentheses.42
Table 7
GLS panel estimates
(dependent  varable: private investment/GDP)
1  2  3  4
Constant  14.235***  14.492*  14.770***  14.993w
(1.427)  (1.563)  (2.077)  (2.339)
Real  GDP per  capita  0.001***  0.001  **  0.004*  0.004*
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)
GDP growth  0.021  0.018  0.030  0.033
(0.023)  (0.023)  (0.032)  (0.033)
Public  investment/GDP  0.058*  0.057*  -0.011  -0.002
(0.031)  (0.032)  (0.038)  (0.040)
Terms  of trade  -1.430***  -1.312**  -1.806**  -2.115*
(0.503)  (0.520)  (0.862)  (0.936)
Real interest rate  ---  ---  -5.951*  -5.168
(3.172)  (3.461)
Domestic  credit  growth  -0.000  -0.000  --  --
(0.000)  (0.001)
Public  sector  balance/GDP  0.125***  0.113**  0.072*  0.063
(0.034)  (0.036)  (0.040)  (0.044)
Extemal  debt/GDP  -0.033***  -0.033***  -0.045***  -0.042*
(0.006)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.010)
Inflation  rate  1.218  1.646  -4.510  -3.459
(1.379)  (1.463)  (3.576)  (3.975)
Black  market  premium  -1.221  -1.707*  -1.677  -2.723
(0.894)  (0.943)  (1.341)  (1.472)
Terms  of trade variability  -3.203*  -3.066*  -5.067**  -5.007*
(1.705)  (1.742)  (2.364)  (2.472)
Inflation  variability  -0.001  -0.001  -0.000  -0.000
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)
Black  market  premium  variability  -0.000  -0.001  0.000  0.000
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Real exchange rate variability  1.336  1.368  0.529  0.350
(1.854)  (1.938)  (2.237)  (2.407)
Restrictions on civil liberties  -0.330*  -0.344*  -0.353  -0.333
(0.168)  (0.183)  (0.230)  (0.257)
War  -1.046**  -1.448*  -1.541  -1.750~
(-0.501)  (0.540)  (0.735)  (0.820)
Assasinations  ---  0.105  ---  0.089
(0.094)  (0.127)
Coups d'etat  ---  1.006  ---  1.280
(0.760)  (1.093)
Constitutional Changes  ---  -0.366  ---  -0.149
(0.464)  (0.606)
Cabinet Changes  ---  -0.507*  ---  -0.015
(0.275)  (0.375)
Government Crises  ---  -0.332  ---  0.235
(0.331)  (0.473)
Riots  ---  0.060  ---  -0.049
(0.084)  (0.123)
Revolutions  ---  0.572  ---  0.588
(0.366)  (0.520)
F statistic (p-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
LM error components test  (p-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Hausman test (p-value)  0.707  0.991  0.996  0.999
Number of observations  857  806  476  436
Note:  the symbols  *, *,  and **  respectively  denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.43
Figure  1
Investment  with  costly reversibility
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Figure  2
Investment  with linear adjustment  costs
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